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1. Introduction 
 
The primary and the secondary markets of local currency government bonds 
(treasuries) are a vital part of the financial system of every market economy. In the case of 
Bulgaria, this market was one of the first that developed rapidly in the first years of transition 
in the early 90’s. That was mainly due to the large need for an internal source of financing 
driven by the skyrocketing budget deficits and the exclusion of the country from the 
international capital markets after the moratorium of 1990 on the accumulated foreign debt 
from the communist times. After the Brady bonds deal of 1994 and the achieved foreign debt 
restructuring the country was back on the international markets. However, it was only after 
the financial crisis of 1997 and the introduction of the Currency Board Arrangement (CBA) 
when was Bulgaria on a stabilization track. In that period of budget balancedness and 
macroeconomic stability, the role of the treasuries changed fundamentally. Providing credit to 
the government was not any more the main objective. Further, the Central Bank (CB) is 
banned by law from monetizing the budget deficit under the CBA. All that made the 
treasuries become a liquid low risk instrument in which local and foreign players could invest 
without having been disturbed by any local monetary shocks from open market operations. 
That brought stability to the expectations and thus to the Bulgarian leva (BGN) yield curve. 
Actually, only after the CBA implementation can we talk about a proper yield curve 
evolvement. That is especially valid after 2002 when the true long end segment of the curve 
developed with the Ministry of Finance (MF) started issuing bonds with maturities of 10 and 
15 years. 
In respect to all above, an interesting dilemma appeared. If the state budget needed no 
debt financing until the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, then what policy the MF should follow. In 
these pre-crisis times, the development of the financial system, the high economic growth, 
and the macroeconomic stability increased the demand for high quality instruments from 
banks and large institutional investors, both local and foreign, for diversifying their portfolios. 
The optimal strategy for the Fiscal Authority (FA) seemed to be one of maintaining a stable 
low level of indebtedness by rolling over old debt in a way that does not create shocks to the 
system. Actually, exactly such kind of policy was followed and there was consistency in that 
respect among the governments that took office. So although it lost its macro function, from 
1997 to 2008, the role of the treasuries, and the government debt in general, was broader 
compared to the primary one of financing the budget deficit. It was one of maintaining the 
financial system and the capital market, easing the allocation of risk and return in the 
economy, creating a low risk highly liquid benchmark asset setting the time value of the local 
currency. That is in accordance with the overall philosophy of the CBA. Namely, the setting 
relies on an automatic self-adjustment and no active accommodative macroeconomic policy. 
Such could be followed only indirectly either as a by-product of the financial policy or as a 
positive externality to the overall institutional and society development.  
In respect to the former, the primary role of the CB and the FA is to keep the stability 
of the financial system and achieve low cost of financing of the public sector. That was 
exactly targeted during the boom years by regulation of the financial sector in controlling its 
risk exposure. Further, as already mentioned, if there was no need to finance the budget, from 
a financial point of view it was optimal the spare resources coming from the economic growth 
and the large foreign direct and portfolio investments to be channeled towards reducing the 
foreign debt. Last but not least, an interesting macrofinancial tool in respect to the fiscal 
reserve1 appeared. Despite the pressure it to be discretionally used in the real economy or for 
social needs, its primary role in that period was to accumulate a buffer fund against economic 
1 It is formed by the surplusses the government has accumulated through time, stays deposited in the CB, and is 
treated like a liability on its balance sheet. Any change in this item causes an equivalent change in the monetary 
base and can be considered as a quasi-monetary policy.    
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downturns thus reducing the sovereign risk of the country. It acted counter-cyclically and in 
opposite to the accumulated current account deficit.     
In respect to the latter, interestingly, factors like infrastructure, legal system, 
regulatory regimes, business practices, etc. have a macroeconomic impact through the 
investments inflow and the balance of payments. Under a CBA, this could be a policy tool 
with huge implications not only for the international position of the country, but also for its 
economic development.   
 From the outbreak of the 2008 crisis to now, the role of the treasuries remained again 
within their financial function and hardly can we say that any macro one re-emerged. The 
policy makers stuck to fiscal austerity by reducing the public spending in accordance to the 
shrunk GDP and foreign investments inflow, no changing of the tax rates, and use of the 
accumulated so far large fiscal reserve. Small budget deficits appeared but they were 
completely manageable and unlike many EU members didn’t put the country under risk. The 
increase of the domestic debt was marginal. The economic policy followed was based in 
general on the philosophy that for a small open economy the harmful effect of any rise of the 
debt level would spur a credit risk surge which would completely crowd out any positive 
effects on the aggregate demand. Namely, there would be a transfer of risk from the sovereign 
to the corporate and consumer sectors both though the credit channel in terms of higher 
lending rates and reduced net foreign investments. Although there was a huge initial spike in 
the credit spreads in 2009 driven mainly by a global rise in risk aversion, especially towards 
the emerging markets segment, as well as uncertainty how the local authorities are going to 
fight against the crisis, Bulgaria achieved to have one of the lowest premiums of its treasuries 
across the CEE countries and a stable fiscal position. Further, the country presently covers 
formally the Maastricht convergence criteria in terms of the debt to GDP ratio, total amount 
of debt, and exchange rate. It is also very close to covering the interest rate and the inflation 
criteria giving it even a better position to some core Eurozone members.  
 If the local treasuries curve references the total sovereign risk, any securities the 
country has in foreign hard currency would allow separating it into credit and currency ones. 
Similar to many emerging market countries, Bulgaria went through a restructuring of its 
foreign debt. In 2002, it substituted its Brady bonds with a Eurobond that matured in 2007 and 
two Global bonds denominated in EUR and US dollar maturing in 2013 and 2015 
respectively. These instruments lack the complicated cash flow structures of the old Brady 
bonds and have higher liquidity. Referenced to the German Bunds they instantly started to 
serve as a suitable benchmark for the credit risk of the country. Interestingly, they had a very 
positive influence on the domestic treasuries market by making possible to price the longer 
term segment of the curve with a mark up over them. The latter captures the currency risk. 
However, the bonds were just giving several dots of a hypothetical risky EUR curve and 
getting a benchmark for the credit risk for the whole maturity spectrum was not possible. 
Only after instruments like CDS became relatively liquid from 2003 does this become 
feasible. 
Both the credit and the currency spreads serve as important indicators for the 
sovereign risk. They are characterized by complex dynamics and it is important their 
informational content to be well understood. This poses not only an empirical challenge, but 
also a theoretical one. Namely, since the interest rate is simultaneously a financial and a 
macroeconomic variable, very diverse forces act on the yield curves and the risky spreads. On 
one hand, imposing no-arbitrage puts certain restrictions on their shape and the evolution of 
the driving factors2. On the other hand, being items on the liability side of an aggregate 
sovereign balance sheet, the foreign bonds, the treasuries, and the monetary base must show 
an internal consistency if viewed as financial contracts with payoffs contingent on the 
2 like smoothness of the former and mean reversion of the latter 
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country’s assets. Last but not least, the rates and the spreads are part of important macro 
transmission channels that must be considered together with other macro variables. Such a 
multifaceted analysis is highly desirable and requires setting up formal models that can serve 
later as a base for empirical applications.    
 The paper will follow exactly such an approach. First, we build a coherent theoretical 
setting for analyzing the credit and currency spreads of a risky sovereign that follows a fixed 
exchange rate regime. This part is highly motivated by the explained above in length situation 
of Bulgaria, but it has its own separate reading as well. For the purpose we construct from 
scratch a no-arbitrage reduced form model which will allow us not only to understand better 
how to price the treasuries and the foreign bonds, but also to extract the driving factors. This 
is done in the most general Heath-Jarrow-Morton setting. We derive the no-arbitrage 
constitutions, analyze their content, and then move to a specific affine realization. Under it, 
we estimate the model and derive the priced factors. Then we move to a structural financial 
model in the spirit of the classical Merton model for a firm. We extend it suitably to the case 
of a risky sovereign with debt issues in different currencies. We consider formally the 
subordination and the possibility the country to monetize in avoiding nominal default on the 
domestic debt. This setting allows us to derive the fundamental values of the two spreads 
from a financial point of view. Further, it provides us with relevant financial indicators whose 
impact on the extracted factors from before must be considered. We calibrate the structural 
model, derive the indicators’ values, and analyze their influence together with a set of macro 
indicators. That is precisely the second aim of the paper where the focus is explicitly on 
Bulgaria.  
Both from theoretical and empirical points of view the academic literature seems to be 
vague in investigating the issues that have been raised above. In terms of the former, a formal 
setting for analysis of the credit and currency spreads of an emerging market country by no 
arbitrage considerations seems to be lacking. If two countries' interest rate models are well-
known in the academic literature, when credit risk kicks in, there are only a few. However, 
they either consider the problem from a reduced form point of view or from a structural one 
under a single currency debt issue which makes the approach incomplete. In terms of the 
latter, if there is research done on emerging market countries for single spreads, there is none 
to the author’s knowledge for both of them. That is valid for Bulgaria as well.  
For a recent treatment of two countries interest rate models see Bjork (1998) and 
Slinko (2006). However, they focus only on the case of no default risk in a simple diffusion 
setting. Bjork, Kabanov, and Runggaldier (1995) and Bjork, Masi, et. al. (1997) consider a 
HJM framework when the dynamics of the assets is driven by jump diffusions, but again with 
no default risk. Schönbucher (1998) adjusts the HJM framework to the case of default risk but 
only in a single currency setting. Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005) show empirically in a cross-
currency setting that there is dependence between the corporate credit spreads and the 
exchange rate dynamics but do not have formal analysis. Ehlers and Schönbucher (2006) give 
a cross-currency model for CDS of two obligors which accounts for such dependence and 
allows also for jumps in the exchange rate at the default time. However, their setting is 
different from ours due to two reasons. First, the exchange rate is between hard currencies 
which is not our case. Second, we have a single risky obligor issuing bonds with a possible 
monetization effect and macroeconomic forces that act too. So there is a need for a flexible 
reduced form model for the setting we concentrate on and we provide such. From a structural 
point of view, Frenkel et. al. (2004) modify the classical Merton model to the case of a 
country and demonstrate that the analysis does not change too much. Gray and Malone (2008) 
extend their model to a sovereign having both local currency and foreign currency debt issues. 
However, they do not provide explicit formulas for the two risky spreads and do not have any 
factor and sensitivity analysis for them. There are a few papers, see Hoffmaister, et al. (2010) 
for a review, devoted to the yield curves of CEE countries. However, they concentrate mainly 
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on the local currency curves from a macroeconomic point of view. Arbitrage is not tackled 
formally and is not of main concern.  
In the case of Bulgaria, there are several papers dealing with the yield curves and the 
risky spreads but only very indirectly and from specific points of view. Manchev and Budina 
(2000) investigate the determinants of the Bulgarian credit spread extracted from the old 
Brady bonds in a simple regression framework without any no-arbitrage and term structure 
considerations. Nenovsky and Chobanov (2004) concentrate on the short end of the treasuries 
yield curve aiming to extract the systematic risk of the CBA arrangement. Minassian (2005) 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the Brady bonds restructuring deal and to what extent it 
was beneficial for the country.      
 
2. Reduced form setting 
 
In this section, we first lay the foundations in brief for pricing of risky debt in a 
general reduced form setting. Then we move to our concrete model for pricing foreign and 
domestic debt of Bulgaria. We conclude by analysis of the no-arbitrage conditions and pave 
the way for moving to the structural view. 
 
2.1. Risky bonds pricing 
 
We consider a probability space ( )0, ( ) ,t tG P≥Ω  which supports an n − dimensional 
Brownian motion 1 2( , ,..., )
P
nW W W W=  under the objective probability measure P  and a 
marked point process: 
 
: ( , ( ), )B R Rµ ε+ +Ω →  
 
with markers ( ),i iXτ  in a measurable space ( ),E ε , where [ ]0,1E = , and with ε  we denote 
the Borel subsets of E . We assume that ( ), ,dt dxµ ω  has a separable compensator of the 
form: 
: ( , ( ), )
( , , ) ( ; ) ( ; ) ,t
B R R
dt dx h t F dx dt
υ ε
υ ω ω ω
+ +Ω →
=
 
where  
 
( ; ) ( ; , )
R
h t t dxω υ ω
+
= ∫  
 
is a tG  measurable intensity and the marks have a conditional distribution of the jumps 
of ( ; )tF dxω . So we have ( ; ) 1tE F dxω =∫  to hold.  
Effectively, the marked point process ( ),i iXτ  is characterized by the probability 
measure ( ); ,dt dxµ ω  which gives the number of jumps with size dx  in a small time interval 
of dt . The compensator ( ), ,dt dxυ ω  provides a full probability characterization of the 
process. It incorporates in itself two effects. On one hand, we have the intensity ( ; )h t dtω  
which gives the conditional probability of a jump of the process in a small time interval of dt  
based on the whole market information up to t . On the other hand, we have the conditional 
distribution ( ; )tF dxω  of the markers X  in the case of a jump realization. 
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We can look at the jumps of the marked point process as sequential defaults of an 
obligor at random times iτ  that lead to losses iX  at each of them. They can be considered also 
as a set of restructuring events leading to losses for the creditors. Under this general setting, 
the prices of the riskless and risky bonds are given by: 
 
• Riskless bond: 
     ( , ) (exp( ( ) ) | ) exp( ( , ) )
T TQ
tt t
P t T E r s ds G f t s ds= − = −∫ ∫  (1)           
• Risky bond: 
    * *( , ) (exp( ( ) ) ( ; ) | ) ( ; ) exp( ( , ) ),
T TQ
tt t
P t T E r s ds R T G R t f t s dsω ω= − = −∫ ∫  (2) 
                    
where ( )r t , ( , )f t T , and *( , )f t T  are the riskless spot, riskless forward, and risky forward 
rates respectively.  
 The pricing formula for the risky debt could be significantly simplified if assume a 
specific form of the recovery. Under a multiple defaults specification, we have that at every 
default there is a percentage mark down, q , from the previous recovery. This gives the form 
( )( ; ) 1 ( ; , ( ; )i i i iR q X Rω τ ω τ ω τ= − −  and allows us to write: 
 
( ) { }, ( , ) 0
0
, , 1 ( , )s N s
s
dt dx dt dxωµ ω ∆ >
>
=∑  
( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; , ) ( ; , );  ( ;0) 1
E
dR t R t q t x dt dx Rω ω ω µ ω ω= − =∫  
 
If we assume no jumps of the intensity and the risk free rate at the default times, we 
would get the pricing formula: 
 
 
*
*
( )
( , ) (exp( ( ) ) ( ; ) | )
( ; ) exp( ( ( ) ( ) ( ; , ) ( ) ) | ) ( ; ) exp( ( , ) )
e
TQ
tt
T T
s tt E t
q s
P t T E r s ds R T G
R t r s h s q s x F dx ds G R t f t s ds
ω
ω ω ω
= −
= − + = −
∫
∫ ∫ ∫
 
 
It should be noted that there is no “last default” in this setting. So the default intensity 
does not to go to zero after any default. This combined with the continuity of the default 
process makes the general market filtration tG  behave like a background one. Thus we could 
avoid the complications connected with the general well-known Duffie, Schroeder, and 
Skiadas (1994) formula. Further, we have non-separability between the intensity and the 
recovery making the pricing formula to depend only on the generalized 
intensity ( ) ( ; , ) ( )e tEq t q t x F dxω= ∫ .   
 
2.2. Model formulation 
 
2.2.1. General notes  
 
Bulgaria, as already mentioned, has bonds denominated both in BGN and EUR. They 
give rise to two risky yield curves and thus to two risky spreads - credit and currency. In very 
general, the spreads arise due to the possibility the respective credit events to occur and their 
severity. To investigate them, a formal assumption is needed both about their characteristics 
and interdependence. 
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We will consider that the two types of debt have different priorities. The country is 
first engaged in meeting the foreign debt obligation from its limited international reserves. 
The impossibility this to be done leads to default or restructuring. In both cases, there is a 
credit event according to the ISDA classification. The foreign debt has a senior status. The 
spread that arises reflects the credit risk of the country. It is a function of 1) the probability of 
default; 2) the expected loss given default; 3) the risk aversion of the market participants to 
that event. 
The domestic debt stays differently. It reflects the priority of the payments in hard 
currency and it incurs instantly the losses in case of insolvency. So this debt is the first to 
default and is subordinated. Technically, the credit event can be avoided because the country 
can always monetize it and pay the amounts due in local currency taking advantage of the fact 
that there is no resource constraint on it. However, the price for this is abandonment of the 
exchange rate regime, inflation pick-up, and exchange rate devaluation. This leads to real 
devaluation of the domestic debt as well. It is exactly the seigniorage and the dilution effect 
that cause the value to be lost. This resembles the case of a firm issuing more equity to avoid 
default. The spread of the domestic debt over the foreign one constitutes the currency spread. 
Its nature is very broad and it is not only due to the currency mismatch between the two types 
of debt. Namely it is a function of: 1) the probability of default and monetization; 2) the 
exchange rate devaluation after a monetization; 3) exchange rate devaluation solely due to an 
abandonment of the CBA; 4) the risk aversion of market participants to default, exchange rate 
devaluation, and the size of the devaluation. All these effects are captured by our model. 
It must be noted that the effect of subordination should not be very strong for Bulgaria. 
It is much more plausible the domestic and foreign debt to receive an equal treatment. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the country initially pursued a goal to be a member of the EU 
which later transformed to become a member of the Eurozone. Letting a high currency spread 
will not only contradict to the interest rate criterion for joining the ERM II, but also would 
produce a strong negative signal for a CBA instability. However, changing the monetary 
regime always stay as an option exercising of which should be considered as a tail event. 
 
2.2.2.  Technical formulation 
 
We use the setting of Subsection 2.1 modified to have two types of debt and exchange 
rate dynamics. First, we consider the case of no monetization and incurring of nominal losses. 
Then we introduce it and see how the analysis changes. Second, to avoid using of an 
additional marked point process, and thus of a second intensity, the default on the foreign debt 
is modeled indirectly. Namely, we will consider that default on the domestic debt leads to a 
default on the foreign debt as well, but due to the different priority of the two, we have just 
different losses incurred, respectively, recoveries. This means that by controlling recoveries 
we control default. If the insolvency to the domestic debt is so strong that leads to such for the 
foreign one, we incur zero recovery on the domestic debt and some positive one on the 
foreign debt. If the insolvency is mild, then we have only loss to the domestic debt, so we 
incur some positive recovery on the domestic debt and full one on the foreign debt. Third, we 
take as a benchmark Germany and EUR as the base hard currency.    
We continue with the model setup. First, we give the suitable notation and 
assumptions. Then we move to pricing and derivation of the no-arbitrage conditions. 
 
• Notation 
 
( , )EURf t T - nominal forward rate in EUR, Germany (Ger.) 
* ( , )EURf t T - nominal forward rate in EUR, Bulgaria (Bul.) 
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* ( , )BGNf t T - nominal forward rate in BGN, Bulgaria  
* *( , ) ( , ) ( , )EUR EUR EURh t T f t T f t T= − - credit spread, Bulgaria  
* * *
, ( , ) ( , ) ( , )BGN EUR BGN EURh t T f t T f t T= − - currency spread, Bulgaria  
* *( , ) ( , ) ( , )BGN BGN EURh t T f t T f t T= − - general currency spread, Bulgaria  
( , ) exp( ( , ) )
T
EUR EURt
P t T f t s ds= −∫ - domestic bond, Germany 
* *
, ,( , ) ( ) exp( ( , ) )
T
f EUR f EUR EURt
P t T R t f t s ds= −∫ - foreign bond, EUR, Bulgaria  
* *
, ,( , ) ( ) exp( ( , ) )
T
d BGN d BGN BGNt
P t T R t f t s ds= −∫ - domestic bond, BGN, Bulgaria  
0
( ) exp( ( ) )
t
EUR EURB t r s ds= ∫ - bank account, EUR, Germany 
* *
, , 0
( ) ( ) exp( ( ) )
t
f EUR f EUR EURB t R t r s ds= ∫ - bank account, EUR, Bulgaria 
* *
, , 0
( ) ( ) exp( ( ) )
t
d BGN d BGN BGNB t R t r s ds= ∫ - bank account, BGN, Bulgaria 
( )X t - exchange rate, EUR for 1 BGN 
1/ ( )X t - exchange rate, BGN for 1 EUR 
, ( )f EURR t - recovery, foreign bond, EUR, Bulgaria 
, ( )d BGNR t - recovery, domestic bond, BGN, Bulgaria 
 
The notation speaks for itself. We use asterisk to denote risk, the first letter (d or f) to 
denote domestic or foreign debt, and finally the currency of denomination is shown as 
EUR or BGN. 
 
• Currency denominations 
 
* *
, ,( , ) ( ) ( , )d EUR d BGNP t T X t P t T= - domestic bond, EUR, Bulgaria 
* *
, ,( ) ( ) ( )d EUR d BGNB t X t B t= - domestic bank account, EUR, Bulgaria 
* *
, ,
1( , ) ( , )
( )f BGN f EUR
P t T P t T
X t
= - foreign bond, BGN, Bulgaria 
* *
, ,
1( ) ( )
( )f BGN f EUR
B t B t
X t
= - foreign bank account, BGN, Bulgaria 
 
• Intensities 
 
- Foreign debt  
intensity ( ) ( )EURh t h t=  
generalized intensity 
, ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ; , ) ( )EUR e EUR f EUR tEh t q t h t q t x F dxω= ∫  
- Domestic debt  
intensity ( ) ( )BGNh t h t=  
generalized intensity 
, ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ; , ) ( )BGN e BGN d BGN tEh t q t h t q t x F dxω= ∫  
 
The generalized intensity characterizes default. Controlling in a suitable way the 
recovery, we can control it too and thus the default event. We turn attention now to the 
dynamics of the instruments under consideration. 
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• Forward rates 
 
,1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )n PEUR EUR EUR i iidf t T t T dt t T dW tα σ== +∑  
* * * *
,1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )n PEUR EUR EUR i i EURi Edf t T t T dt t T dW t t T x dt dxα σ δ µ== + +∑ ∫  
* * * *
,1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( , )n PBGN BGN BGN i i BGNi Edf t T t T dt t T dW t t T x dt dxα σ δ µ== + +∑ ∫  
 
We assume that in case of default there is a market turmoil leading to a jump in both 
curves. The maturity sector T  of the euro curve jumps by an expected size of 
* ( , , ) ( , )EURE t T x dt dxδ µ∫ , and that of the local currency one by 
* ( , , ) ( , )BGNE t T x dt dxδ µ∫ . 
The terms * ( , , )EUR t T xδ  and 
* ( , , )BGN t T xδ  show the jump sizes of the respective curves 
for every maturity. 
 
• Bank accounts 
 
( ) ( ) ( )EUR EUR EURdB t r t B t dt=  
* * *
, ,( ) ( ) ( )f EUR EUR f EURdB t r t B t dt=  
* * *
, ,( ) ( ) ( )d BGN BGN d BGNdB t r t B t dt=  
 
• Recoveries 
 
,
,
,
( )
( , ) ( , )
( )
f EUR
f EURE
f EUR
dR t
q t x dt dx
R t
µ= −∫  
,
,
,
( )
( , ) ( , )
( )
d BGN
d BGNE
d BGN
dR t
q t x dt dx
R t
µ= −∫  
 
After each default we have a devaluation of the bond by an expected value of 
( , ) ( , )
E
q t x dt dxµ∫ . The stochasticity of the loss is captured by the random jump size 
(.,.)q . 
 
• Exchange rate 
 
( ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) XE
dX t t x dt dx
X t
δ µ= −∫  
 
We assume that in case of default the market turmoil causes an exchange rate 
devaluation by an expected value of ( , ) ( , )XE t x dt dxδ µ∫ . 
 
• Bonds’ prices 
 
( , ) exp( ( , ) ) (exp( ( ) ) | )
fT TQ
EUR EUR EUR tt t
P t T f t s ds E r s ds G= − = −∫ ∫  
* *
, , ,( , ) ( ) exp( ( , ) ) (exp( ( ) ) ( ) | )
fT TQ
f EUR f EUR EUR EUR f EUR tt t
P t T R t f t s ds E r s ds R T G= − = −∫ ∫  
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* * *
, , ,
,
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp( ( , ) )
(exp( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) | )
f
T
d EUR d BGN d BGN BGNt
TQ
EUR d BGN tt
P t T P t T X t R t X t f t s ds
E r s ds R T X T G
= = −
= −
∫
∫
 
 
• Arbitrage 
 
Under standard regularity conditions (see Bjork, Masi, Kabanov, and Runggaldier 
(1995)), the system to be free of arbitrage, all traded assets denominated in EUR must 
have a rate of return EURr  under 
fQ . This means that the processes: 
 
 
* * * *
, , , ,( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )( , ) , , , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f EUR f EUR d BGN d BGNEUR
EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
B t P t T B t T X t P t T X tP t T
B t B t B t B t B t
          (NoArb) 
 
must be local martingales under fQ . For our purposes being martingales would be 
enough. 
 
 We move to deriving the no-arbitrage conditions. Taking the stochastic differential of 
the upper expressions, omitting the technicalities to Appendix 1, we can get: 
 
 
,
* ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f EUREUR EUR q
r t r t h t tϕ− =  (3) 
 ( ), , ,* * ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X d BGN X d BGN f EURBGN EUR q q qr t r t h t t t t tδ δϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− = − + −  (4) 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
T
EUR EUR EUR EURt
t T t T t s ds t T tα σ σ σ φ= −∫  (5) 
 ,*
,* * * *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )f EUR X
EUR
T q
EUR EUR EUR EURt
t T t T t s ds t T t h t tδ
θ
α σ σ σ φ ϕ= − +∫  (6) 
 ,*
,* * * *( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ),d BGN X
BGN
T q
BGN BGN BGN BGNt
t T t T t s ds t T t h t tδ
θ
α σ σ σ φ ϕ= − +∫  (7) 
 
where we used the notation: 
 
 * * * *exp( ( , , ) ),  exp( ( , , ) )
T T
EUR EUR BGN BGNt t
t s x ds t s x dsθ δ θ δ= − = −∫ ∫  (8) 
 , ,..., ,... ( ) ( ...)((1 )(1 )...) ( , ) ( )
x y
a b tE
t ab x y t x F dxϕ = − − Φ∫  (9) 
 
and employed either vector notation or scalar products where necessary for simplicity. 
 By ( , )t xΦ  and ( )tφ  we denote the Girsanov’s kernels of the counting process and the 
Brownian motion vector respectively when changing the probability measure from P  to fQ . 
The term ( )tϕ  gives scaled the expected jump sizes of the counting process. We can give 
interpretation of  ( )tφ  as the market price of diffusion risk and of ( )tϕ  as the market price of 
jump risk. Parametrizing the volatilities and the market prices of risk, as well as imposing 
suitable dynamics on ( )h t , we give a full characterization to our system. Further, the intensity 
could be a function of the underlying processes of the rates, so we could get correlation 
between the intensity, the interest rates, and the exchange rate.  
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2.2.3. Spreads diagnostics – reduced form view 
 
It is important to give a deeper interpretation of the no-arbitrage conditions and see 
what factors drive the credit and the currency spreads. Equations (5) – (7) give modified the 
standard HJM drift restriction. The slight change from the classical riskless case is due to the 
jumps that take place at default. Equation (3) shows that the credit risk is proportional to the 
intensity of default and the scaled expected LGD by the coefficient controlling the risk 
aversion. The higher they are, the higher the spread is. Equation (4) gives the currency spread. 
The intensity of default and the difference between the two LGDs in BGN and EUR, scaled 
by the coefficient controlling the risk aversion, act like in the previous case. It is both 
important and interesting to note that inflation does not appear directly and it influences the 
spreads, as the next section shows, only through a secondary channel. 
The monetization option in case of default needs a special analysis. In the above 
considerations, it was generally posed that there is a loss of ,1 ( )d LCR T−  on default of the 
domestic debt. However, if a full monetization is applied, then we would have , ( ) 1d LCR T =  
and thus 
, ,
( ) ( ) 0
X d BGN Xq
t tδ δϕ ϕ= = . If such a monetary injection is neutral to nominal values, it 
is not to real ones. Devaluation arises due to the abandonment of the CBA and the higher 
amount of money in circulation. Its effect can be measured differently based on what we take 
as a base - the price index or the exchange rate. Most naturally, we can expect both of them to 
depreciate due to the structural macrolinks that exist between these variables. For quantifying 
the amount we would need a macromodel which is beyond the scope of the reduced form 
model presented. The latter only shows what characteristics the market prices in general 
without imposing concrete macrolinks among them. Depending on what the base is we would 
have a direct estimation of certain type of indicators and an indirect one of the rest up to the 
amount they structurally influence the former. If the inflation is taken as a base, then we 
would have the comparison of inflation indexed bonds to the non-indexed ones. The spread 
between them would give an estimate for the expected inflation. Unfortunately, such an 
analysis is unrealistic in reality due to the fact that such bonds are issued very rarely in 
emerging market countries. In the case of Bulgaria, there is none. If the exchange rate is taken 
as a base, then we would have the comparison of domestic debt bonds to foreign debt bonds. 
The spread between them would give an estimate for the currency risk and the devaluation 
effect. The estimate for the inflation would be indirect and based on hypothetical structural 
links. 
Whether the country would monetize or would declare a formal default is based on 
strategic considerations. It is a matter of structural analysis which option it would take. By all 
means, its decision is priced. In case of default, the pricing formula is equation (4). In case of 
monetization, we would have a jump in the exchange rate and let's denote its size3 by  Xδ . So 
we will get: 
 
  ,
* *( ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))
f EURXBGN EUR q
r t r t h t t t
δ
ϕ ϕ− = −  (10) 
 
There is not any arbitrage argument that  , ,,( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X d BGN X d BGNX q qt t t tδ δδϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= − +  must 
hold so that the two scenarios become equivalent. The only information we get from the 
market is an estimate for the generalized intensity being it ( ) ( )Xh t tδϕ  or 
, ,,
( )( ( ) ( ) ( ))
X d BGN X d BGNq q
h t t t tδ δϕ ϕ ϕ− +  not knowing which scenario will realize. 
   
3 It will be different from the no-monetarization one, Xδ , due to the different regimes that are followed. 
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2.3. Affine specification 
 
The abstract formulation of the model in a HJM setting has made possible to give 
interpretations of the risky spreads from arbitrage point of view. For a concrete empirical 
estimation we need to specify the volatilities and the generalized intensities so that we could 
get convenient pricing formulas and make the model work. We turn to an affine setting where 
semi-closed form solutions for the prices of the bonds could be found. A further argument for 
using the latter specification is the well known fact that affine models are rich enough in the 
sense that they are the only family that allows finite dimensional realizations of the HJM 
dynamics and thus clear factor analysis. A theoretical discussion can be found in Filipovic and 
Teichmann (2002) for the diffusion case and in Tappe (2009) for the case allowing for jumps.  
We impose the following simple dynamics under the risk neutral foreign measure: 
 
• Riskless country benchmark in EUR: 
 
 1 2( ) ( ) ( )EURr t s t s t= +  (11) 
 
with latent factors having the dynamics:  
 
 ( ) ( ( )) ( )
fQ
ii i i i ids t k s t dt dW tθ σ= − + , 1, 2i =  (12) 
• Credit spread 
 
 * 1 1 2 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )EURh t b s t b s t s t= + +  (13) 
 
where we implicitly assume a constant market price of jump risk and 3( )s t  is a new 
latent factor with dynamics: 
 
 33 3 3 3 3( ) ( ( )) ( )
fQds t k s t dt dW tθ σ= − +  (14) 
 
• Currency spread 
 
 * 1 2 31 2 3 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BGNh t b s t b s t b s t s t= + + +  (15) 
                                                                               
where we again implicitly assume a constant market price of jump risk and 4 ( )s t  is a 
new latent factor with dynamics:  
 
 44 4 4 4 4( ) ( ( )) ( )
fQds t k s t dt dW tθ σ= − +  (16) 
 
Further, we have  i ii i
ik
σ φ
θ θ= − , 1, 2,3, 4i = , where iφ  can be considered as market 
prices of diffusion risk. 
 
Several general things must be observed about the above structure. First, we do not 
consider jumps in the factors and thus in the intensities. That would lead just to an 
overparametrization and is not needed. So the formulas (1) and (2) would be valid. Second, 
we do not stick to the classical canonical form of the processes as in Dai and Singleton (2000) 
because it would be difficult to give them a direct economic interpretation. So we use more 
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general dynamics but reduce the number of parameters appropriately by controlling the 
weights of the factors. Thus, when we do not give a weight to a factor, this is due exactly to 
that reason. Such approach was followed in Pearson and Sun (1994) and Duffee (1999). From 
an econometric point of view the specification is equivalent to the canonical model in terms of 
richness. Third, the above factors' dynamics corresponds to the Gaussian (Vasicek) affine 
family. We preferred it to a CIR or to the mixed case due to its tractability. As many empirical 
studies have shown, it is much more flexible in fitting the data. Further, as we will see, there 
is a possibility for negative spreads and the Gaussian dynamics allows for this. Last but not 
least, we do not impose correlation on the Brownian motions of the factors, because we do not 
pursue to having a humped instantaneous forward rates maturity structure. The latter is an 
issue for interest rate option pricing, but not when we deal with bonds where we have an 
empirically decreasing volatility structure. See for a further discussion Brigo and Mercurio 
(2002). Closed for formulas for the bond prices could be also found there. 
    The factors' structure above is not specified ad hoc. It has a direct relation to the 
forward and exchange rate dynamics as well as to the no-arbitrage conditions (3) and (4). 
Equation (13) is just equation (3) but modified appropriately. We have:  
 
 
,
* *
1 1 2 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )f EUREUR q EUR EURh t h t t r t r t b s t b s t s tϕ= = − = + +  (17) 
    
where the coefficients 1b  and 2b  give the factors’ weights and allow us to control the 
correlation between ( )EURr t  and 
* ( )EURh t . The term , ( )f EURq tϕ , encompassing the jump risk and 
the recovery, is assumed to be constant and stays implicitly incorporated in the weights and in 
the coefficients of the diffusions. In the same way, equation (15) is just equation (4). We 
have:  
 
 ,
* * *
1 2, 1 2 3 3 4( ) ( )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )f EURXBGN EUR q BGN EURh t h t t t r t r t b s t b s t b s t s tδϕ ϕ= − = − = + + +  (18) 
 
where the coefficients 1b , 2b , and 3b  give the factors’ weights. This provides econometric 
flexibility and allows us to control the correlations among ( )EURr t , 
* ( )EURh t , and 
*
, ( )BGN EURh t . 
The term 
,
( )
d BGNq
tϕ  encompassing the jump risk and the recoveries, as well as the exchange 
rate depreciation size  ( )X tδϕ , is assumed to be constant and stays implicitly incorporated in 
the factor weights and the coefficients of the diffusions. 
 Special attention should be given to the process 4 ( )s t . If we consider the terms 
,
( ) ( )
f EURq
h t tϕ  and  ,( )( ( ) ( ))f EURX qh t t tδϕ ϕ− , we see that the currency spread should not be 
influenced by an additional factor over the credit spread unless we work with different 
stochastic recovery rates for the two bonds or/and stochastic size of the devaluation of the 
exchange rate. That latter is completely valid. Further, adding such an additional factor would 
be helpful from an econometric point of view too and will provide us with more flexibility in 
the estimation procedure.  
 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
 
In this subsection, we estimate empirically the reduced form model presented. First, 
we start with data description and general statistical analysis. Then we move to the concrete 
model estimation by Kalman filter. The empirical section can be viewed as an application of 
the theoretical setting we developed.  
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2.4.1. General notes 
 
We take as a risk free rate benchmark the German bunds curve. If until recently that 
was an innocuous assumption, with the Eurozone turmoil provoked by the Greek debt 
problems started in April 2010, an interesting dilemma appears. Germany is the major donor 
in the rescue packages voted by the European Commission so some risk of the periphery 
countries got transferred to it. This is reflected in the German CDS quotes which from 
completely illiquid and in the rage of 0-10 bps from mid 2008 started an upward movement to 
reach levels of 60-90 bps during the peaks of the Lehman and the Eurozone crises. At the 
same time the yields of the German bunds exactly during these shock periods were falling. 
That was not only due to the expansionary monetary policy of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), but also to the fact that the German bunds served as a safe heaven. There was a 
massive flight to quality to them. So Germany as a sovereign started bearing a credit risk, but 
at the same time its treasuries become even less riskless. However, the participants in the 
Bulgarian secondary market for treasuries did not change their attitude to take the German 
bunds as a benchmark. So their use in our analysis seems to be the best choice. 
We concentrate on the period 01/04/2004 – 31/12/2011 capturing both pre-crisis and 
post-crisis times. We build the EUR curve by using quotes for CDS. The Eurobond and the 
Global bonds outstanding characteristics are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Bulgarian foreign bonds 
Instrument Characteristics 
Currency Issue date Maturity date Coupon 
Eurobond EUR 01/11/2001 01/03/2007 7.25% 
Global bond EUR 22/03/2002 15/01/2013 7.50% 
Global bond USD 22/03/2002 15/01/2015 8.25% 
 
It is clear that they are completely insufficient to have a full term structure. If before the crisis 
the liquidity of the CDS was not enough, from 2008 crisis, and especially after 2010 start of 
the Eurozone crisis their liquidity increased tremendously. As already mentioned in the 
introduction, initially the market participants were pricing the BGN treasuries referencing 
them to the Eurobond and the Global bonds. However, later they switched to the CDS. This 
gives support for our approach. To be completely precise, we take the CDS spreads, extract 
the probabilities of default, and then construct risky yields to maturity. That enables us to 
refer them to the German benchmark curve and derive the credit spread. Further, it must be 
emphasized that the phenomenon of basis appears between the CDS and the Eurobonds. 
However, as Figure 9 shows, hardly can we see any systematic pattern in its evolution. So 
sticking to CDS would not lead to a material loss of informational content. We take closing 
bid quotes from Bloomberg at 17.00 London time.   
 We build the Bulgarian BGN treasuries curve using coupon bonds and McCulloch 
(1977) smoothing procedure. It happens that it gives more stable results than the alternative 
Nelson-Siegel and Svensson procedures. We take closing bid quotes from Reuters and 
Bloomberg both of the outstanding and already matured bonds. 
  
2.4.2. Market and statistical analysis 
 
We begin with a visual plot of the spreads. Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 give the 
credit, currency, and general currency spreads evolution respectively. Figure 4 gives the two 
spreads by maturity spectrum. Figure 5 gives the yields by maturity spectrum of the German 
curve. 
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Figure 1. Credit spread evolution 
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Figure 2. Currency spread evolution 
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Figure 3. General currency spread evolution 
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Figure 4. Risky spreads by maturity spectrum 
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Figure 5. German yields by maturity spectrum 
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In all the figures, the events: 1 - GM and Ford ratings downgrade of May 09, 2005, 2 - 
Liquidity crisis of August 09, 2007, 3 - Bear Sterns default of March 14, 2008, 4 - Lehman 
default of September 15, 2008, 5 - Greek turmoil start of April 23, 2010, 6 – the US rating 
downgrade of August 05, 2011 are marked by the vertical dashed lines.  
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) of the driving factors of the curves is shown 
in Table 2. We can see that both for the risky spreads and the German yields three factors 
could be extracted with real significance in explaining the variance to be only two of them. 
The eigen vectors plot shows, as usual, that they can be interpreted as shift and slope. In the 
period under consideration, we have an average increase of all the yields and spreads making 
the shift slightly positive. The slope, defined as the difference between the long end and the 
short end of the curves, is positive on average for the German yields and negative for the risky 
spreads. In the former case, this is due to the downward move of the short end of the curve 
influenced by the significant decrease of the Eurozone refi rate as a major policy tool of the 
ECB for providing monetary stimulus during the crisis. Further, a flight to liquidity effect is 
also largely present. In the latter one, the turbulent times from the second half of the period 
led to a significant risk aversion towards the EM segment, fear of fiscal problems driven by 
the recession, and negative expectations for the Bulgarian creditworthiness. Since the default 
possibility and exchange rate devaluations were expected mainly in the short run, this caused 
the spreads rise sharply producing flat and inverted risky spreads curves. It is interesting to go 
beyond the average picture the eigenvectors plot provides and see the dynamics of the curves 
through time. 
 
Table 2. PCA analysis 
 Bulgaria Germany 
Factor % / Object Credit spread Currency spread Yield 
Shift 98.60 91.39 95.76 
Slope 1.36 6.38 4.03 
Rotation 0.03 2.20 0.21 
4 0.00 0.03 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Concretely, for the German curve we have a standard evolution over the business 
cycle. In the beginning of the period under consideration it was increasing. Then predicting 
the monetary policy tightening, the curve gradually flattened. During the very realizations of 
the refi rate hikes, it became almost flat. Hardly can we claim that the curve predicted the 
recession with a raise in its slope. During the Bear Sterns default and the first signals about 
the coming turmoil there was an erratic behavior. The ambivalence of the situation whether 
we would have a soft landing or a deep recession led to these fluctuations. Further, there was 
a fear of stagflation making the monetary easing not the best policy. After the Lehman 
default, it became clear that both the credit system and the fast slowing economy needed a 
huge liquidity injection so that a depression would be avoided. Interestingly, the long end of 
the curve dropped significantly too fueling expectations for a long recession and continued 
monetary easing. 
For the credit spread three periods could be outlined - two normal ones and one 
extraordinary. The normal ones were during in the economic boom from 2004-2007 and after 
the end of the recession from 2009. During the former Bulgaria didn’t follow a very different 
pattern from the other CEE countries. Namely, the prolonged low interest rate policies of 
ECB lead to high economic growth and boom in foreign investments in the whole region 
having at certain moments the characteristics of a bubble. With the exception of Hungary that 
led to strong budget positions. Servicing the foreign debt was significantly eased. All that led 
to a strong decrease in the credit spread. A further factor specific for Bulgaria was that the 
period also coincided with the country being on the final stage to a full EU membership. This 
contributed additionally to lowering the risk premium. As already discussed, Bulgaria also 
followed a macroeconomic policy that was neutral to any balance of payments or inflation 
considerations. The focus was only on achieving stability of the financial sector through 
prudential regulation. There were not any sterilization operations through issuing domestic 
debt. Thus the high investment inflow led to budget surpluses, accumulation of fiscal reserve 
that acted as a risk buffer to the current account deficits, and a significant reduction of the 
total debt to GDP ratio from 45.2% to 14.9% for the whole period. This helped to reduce the 
credit spread further. The spread curve itself had a positive slope. The usual term premium 
appeared pointing out that default was more likely in the long run. During the crisis times the 
CDS overreacted to news bringing an instant shift increase and slope decrease. The later even 
become negative and the credit curve was inverted for a short period. Then both factors 
gradually moved in a direction to restoring the pre-crisis time levels. The start of the 
economic recovery and the improvement of the fiscal position together with the general 
market sentiment helped for that too. However, the shift still remained higher due to the 
uncertainty in global economy and the start of the Eurozone crisis. The slope gained back its 
previous form. 
The currency spread dynamics is more complicated. It does not incorporate any 
inflation expectations and is only indirectly influenced by any macro forces. In principle, it 
should just reflect the subordination of the local currency debt and the tail possibility of 
devaluation abandoning the CBA. These considerations seem to be valid but only during the 
crisis period. In general, it happened that other effects matter too and their influence needs a 
special analysis. 
The period 2004-2005 was characterized initially for a short while with increasing 
spreads due to the political uncertainty what policy the new government elected in mid 2005 
would take. Then there was a prolonged trend of a decreasing currency spread and an inverted 
shape of the spread curve. If the overall macro stability is the main driver for the former, the 
latter could be attributed to the pending EU membership. So any risks of CBA abandonment 
were viewed short termed. The membership itself was considered as an implicit guarantee for 
stability and access to European funding. Further factor for the quick decrease of the spreads 
was the significant accumulation of free cash by the large local institutional investors who had 
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a significant home bias to investing in domestic treasuries. Some of them like the pension 
funds were also under a strict regulation to hold at least 50% of their portfolio in these 
instruments. The treasuries were also largely used as risk free collateral and thus had a special 
status granted by law. In this period, there were also made some changes to the legislation 
giving more liquidity of the domestic market. Such were the shortened settlement date of the 
local payment system and the abandonment of the bid ask spread for converting EUR to 
BGN. 
At the end of 2005, a clear trend for raising the rates in the Eurozone emerged as a 
consequence of the attempt of the ECB to gradually cool the economy and curb the inflation. 
The BGN treasuries curve also followed that movement but with a small delay. Since the 
credit spread was already on a very low level, the phenomenon of negative currency spread 
appeared. It lasted till mid 2009. Interestingly, at every shock it became bigger. Four are the 
main drivers for that abnormal situation. First, the local treasuries market had started to have 
less liquidity since 2006. The reason for this was that the boom in the corporate and consumer 
credits and the bubble on the stock exchange were channeling the resources out of fixed 
income segment to these more profitable ones. The treasuries in most of the cases were 
subject to buy and hold strategy. At the same time, the CDS were increasing their liquidity 
and the price discovery about the sovereign risk of the country could be attributed to them. 
Although the BGN curve followed, in general, the dynamics of the benchmark, it was sticky 
to shocks. Thus every abrupt rise in the credit spread artificially reduced the currency one. 
Second, if the treasuries started suffering from liquidity draught, exactly the opposite was 
valid for the banking system and the financial system in general. Even offering lower yield, 
there was still demand for them for diversification needs and in their role as collateral. The 
issues by the MF were kept constant because of no need for positive net financing, but the 
cash in the banks and investors was increasing. Thus a segmented demand for the treasuries 
appeared and no other financial asset could substitute them. So this led the negative currency 
spread to prevail for a long time. This also explains the very erratic behavior of the spread till 
2009. Third, as Figure 3 shows, the whole 2006 was marked by even a negative general 
currency spread for the maturity sector of 1 year. This did not lead to a negative credit spread, 
but just to a greater negative magnitude of the currency one. This could again be explained by 
the segmented demand for this sector. Namely, the very short maturity is preferred by some 
institutional investors aiming greater liquidity of their portfolios. This is especially valid for 
the Bulgarian Deposit Insurance Fund which should follow a very conservative strategy in 
investing its resources by by-laws. Fourth, there are transaction costs in implementing an 
arbitrage strategy to take advantage of the negative spread. If the domestic banks and funds 
are the main holders of treasuries, they have very limited access to instruments like CDS due 
to their general focus on the local market. Interestingly, even the negative currency spreads 
coming from the Eurobond and the Global bond were not taken advantage of. The arbitrage 
strategy is connected with taking a position in reverse repo in the treasuries and a 
simultaneous purchase of the Eurobond or the Global bond. However, there is a significant 
risk that once sold on the market, the treasuries cannot be bought back especially in a low 
liquidity market.   
With Bulgaria entering the EU, no big change in the treasuries market was observed. 
There was also no huge inflow of foreign capital to that segment mainly due to the higher 
attractiveness of credit and equity. The curve did not change significantly its dynamics. From 
the turmoil of 2007 till the relative stabilization of mid 2009, the treasuries always 
underreacted to shocks. This led to an increase in the negative spread. Further, the curve 
inverted again discounting negative shocks in the short run. From mid 2009 till the Greek 
crisis, we can say that both spreads were close to equilibrium levels with the effect of 
undereaction been cleared. The currency spread was about 100 bp and was reflecting mainly 
the risk that the country could abandon the CBA in fighting with the crisis.  
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2.4.3. Estimation results 
 
We estimate the model by Kalman filter. The joint estimation of equations of such 
kind, although giving more efficient parameter estimates, is numerically very costly in 
computer time. We keep to the simpler, but asymptotically equivalent, approach of equation 
by equation estimation as in Duffee (1999). For this purpose we first estimate equations (11) 
and (12) using the German yield curve data. Then we find estimates of 1( )s t  and 2 ( )s t  in 
terms of 1( )s t  and 2 ( )s t  by smoothing. Then we plug them into (13). Using the credit spread 
data, we estimate (13) and (14) to find the filtered factor 3( )s t . Finally, we plug all the 
filtered latent factors 1( )s t , 2 ( )s t , and 3( )s t  into (15), and use the currency spread data to 
estimate (15) and (16). The estimated coefficients are represented below. 
 
Table 3. Estimation results 
Country Coefficients 
Ger. 
1( )k t  1( )tθ  1( )tσ  1( )tφ  2 ( )k t  2 ( )tθ  2 ( )tσ  2 ( )tφ  h   
0.26* 9.82* 0.77* 1.88* -0.02* -2.82 0.38* -4.52* 0.002*  
(0.00) (1.24) (0.02) (0.40) (0.00) (7.43) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00)  
Bul. 
credit 
spread 
2 ( )k t  2 ( )tθ  2 ( )tσ  2 ( )tφ  3 ( )k t  3 ( )tθ  3 ( )tσ  3 ( )tφ  h  2b  
-0.02* -2.82 0.38* -4.52* 0.11* 5.82* 0.40* -0.08* 0.08* -0.45* 
(0.00) (7.43) (0.00) (0.37) (0.002) (0.54) (0.002) (0.18) (0.001) (0.02) 
Bul. 
currency 
spread 
2 ( )k t  2 ( )tθ  2 ( )tσ  2 ( )tφ  4 ( )k t  4 ( )tθ  4 ( )tσ  4 ( )tφ  h  2b  
-0.02* -2.82 0.38* -4.52* 0.13 11.8* 0.40* 2.53* 0.12* 0.35* 
(0.00) (7.43) (0.00) (0.37) (0.002) (0.47) (0.003) (0.18) (0.001) (0.01) 
The brackets represent the standard errors ; * signific. at 1%. 
 
We observe significance of two factors for the German curve. The same is valid for 
the spread curves. For them one factor is coming from the German curve and the other is 
idiosyncratic. This is completely in line with the PCA analysis. However, it is interesting to 
see what exactly the relationship between the factors from the Kalman filter and the ones from 
the PCA analysis is. Theoretically, the former should be considered as more correctly 
representing the driving forces behind the curves, because they are based on a no-arbitrage 
model. Unfortunately, they lack any interpretation and represent just statistical quantities. We 
gradually move to analyzing their informational content. 
It is good to have initially a geometric view on the filtered factors. Table 4 gives the 
correlations between them and the ones derived from the PCA analysis. 
 
Table 4. Factors’ correlations 
Bulgaria 
PCA Kalman 
Shift Slope Ger. Spr. EUR Spr. BGN 
Ger. Spr. EUR Spr. BGN Ger. Spr. EUR Spr. BGN fact. 1 fact. 2 
PC
A
 
Shift 
Ger. 1,00 0,24 0,34 0,00 -0,20 0,36 0,99 -0,38 -0,06 -0,20 
Spr. EUR 0,24 1,00 -0,25 -0,64 0,00 -0,02 0,25 -0,69 0,94 -0,41 
Spr. LC. 0,34 -0,25 1,00 -0,28 0,06 0,00 0,35 -0,39 -0,35 0,82 
Slope 
Ger. 0,00 -0,64 -0,28 1,00 -0,17 0,29 0,00 0,92 -0,66 -0,30 
Spr. EUR -0,20 0,00 0,06 -0,17 1,00 0,47 -0,20 -0,08 0,07 0,19 
Spr. LC. 0,36 -0,02 0,00 0,29 0,47 1,00 0,36 0,13 -0,14 -0,19 
K
alm
an 
Ger. fact. 1 0,99 0,25 0,35 0,00 -0,20 0,36 1,00 -0,39 -0,06 -0,21 
fact. 2 -0,38 -0,69 -0,39 0,92 -0,08 0,13 -0,39 1,00 -0,59 -0,20 
Spr. EUR -0,06 0,94 -0,35 -0,66 0,07 -0,14 -0,06 -0,59 1,00 -0,35 
Spr. LC. -0,20 -0,41 0,82 -0,30 0,19 -0,19 -0,21 -0,20 -0,35 1,00 
                
 20 
We see that the Kalman filter factors coming from the German curve are highly 
correlated with the shift and the slope coming from the PCA analysis. So we can give them 
exactly such an interpretation. The remaining factors of the credit and currency spreads are 
highly correlated with the corresponding shift factors, so they get such an interpretation. 
Further, it is the German slope factor that becomes relevant for the two spreads.  
It is interesting to plot the evolution of the derived smoothed factors. We are going to 
do this in a special way. Namely, we construct indices starting from unity and then plot the 
relative performance. We do this to avoid possible miscalling that could arise due to 
numerical reasons coming from the specification of the affine model. Figure 6 presents the 
results for the credit spread factor and Figure 7 for the currency spread one. 
 
Figure 6. Credit spread factor dynamics 
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Figure 7. Currency spread factor dynamics 
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We see that the plot of the German factors evolution largely reflects the analysis we 
made above about the behavior of the shape of the yield curve through the period under 
consideration. Interestingly, only the slope was subject to a risk aversion by the market 
participants and this is reflected by the negative sign of the coefficient 2 ( )tφ .  
The credit spread shift factor dynamics shows an interesting pattern. Namely, there 
was a relative stability of it till the start of the credit crunch turmoil in mid 2007. So the 
observed general decrease in the credit spread was mainly due to the influence of the German 
slope. This can be interpreted in two ways. On one hand, the started rise in the Germen curve 
from late 2005 was not accompanied by a similar move of the Bulgarian CDS curve. So that 
led to a technical tightening of the credit spread. On the other hand, the latter was a reflection 
of the fact that both the economies were booming. So if the German needed cooling through 
interest rate hikes, the Bulgarian one was considered to becoming less risky. However, it 
remains an open question what economic forces stay behind the shift factor. It is expected to 
have a whole bunch of them. On one hand, they should reflect that the economic growth in 
Bulgaria was relatively higher making the country less risky compared to the German one. 
Here the general convergence argument could be applied. On the other hand, they should be a 
mix of local macro and financial indicators that need to be carefully selected. Last but not 
least, the impact of the global risk aversion factors needs to be included here. We do this a bit 
later.  
From the market turmoil of 2007 on, the volatility of the shift factor increased 
tremendously. Further, it was the main driver for the increase of the credit spread. The 
German slope factor was still present, but its significance was lower. We see very strong 
spikes during the Lehman and the Greek crises periods.     
The currency spread factor has a very erratic performance through the whole period 
under consideration. This reflected the same behavior of the currency spread itself. The most 
notable feature that can be observed is that, as mentioned before, the negative currency spread 
during the shocks in the crisis periods are due to an overreaction of the CDS curve and an 
undereaction of the treasuries one. At those times, the shift factors of the credit and currency 
spreads have opposite movements. It is interesting to note also that if there is some risk 
aversion towards the credit spread shift factor, there is no such towards the currency spread 
one. This is a further evidence for the artificially subdued values of it and is helpful in 
explaining the prolonged for long time negative spread. 
It must be emphasized that the overreaction of the CDS to shocks was not only linked 
to this specific choice for representing the Bulgarian EUR yield curve. The same pattern is 
observed if we consider the credit and currency spreads derived from the Eurobond with 
maturity 2007 and the Global bond with maturity 2013. This is shown in Figure 8. Since the 
bonds are coupon ones, we use the standard concept of z-spread to derive the risky spreads. 
Further, since the bonds change their maturity at every observation through the considered 
period, we control that by taking the corresponding maturities of the interpolated German 
bunds benchmark curve and the BGN treasuries one. 
Finally, as already mentioned, hardly can we claim that there is a very ostensible 
pattern in the basis that arises. It is shown in Figure 9 as a difference between the pure risky 
yield induced by the CDS and the z-spread of the two bonds.        
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Figure 8. Risky spreads of Euro/Global bond 2007/2013 
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Figure 9. Basis of Euro/Global bond 2007/2013 
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3. Structural setting 
 
In this section, we lay the foundations of the structural view on the domestic and 
foreign debt of a risky country under a fixed exchange rate regime. It could be considered as 
an extension of the classical Merton model. Then we analyze what explanatory power the 
setting could provide. We conclude the section with an application to Bulgaria.  
 
3.1. Model formulation 
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We focus our attention on an aggregated balance sheet of Bulgaria encompassing the 
balances of the CB and the MF. Its liability side consists of three items in terms of seniority - 
foreign debt, domestic debt, and monetary base. In the reduced form model, we controlled the 
seniority by suitable distributions of the recovery rates. However, despite enough for the 
analysis there, this was artificial and does not provide good financial characteristics of the 
instruments. When we view the two types of debt as coexisting and being contingent claims 
on the country assets, a structural view is needed. Under such the subordination is made 
ostensible and is defined by the different default boundaries the three items have. 
If in the reduced setting default could happen at any instant and was constructed as a 
totally inaccessible stopping time, here, in the structural one, it could take place only at the 
maturity of the debt4 T  in case the country assets fall below the face value of the debt. We 
assume that the country assets denominated in EUR are given by the sum: 
 
 , , ,( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),d EUR d EUR d BGNA t MM t A t X t= +  (19) 
 
where , ( )d EURMM t  is any monetization used, ( )X t , as before, is the exchange rate EUR for 1 
unit of BGN considered fixed, and , ( )d BGNA t  are the assets in BGN. Further, we specify the 
face values of the foreign and the domestic debt to be ,f EURB  and ,d BGNB  respectively. The 
subordination of the domestic debt to the foreign one is made explicit by assuming that that 
the default boundary of the foreign debt is ,f EURB  and that of the domestic one is 
, ,( )f EUR d BGNB X T B+ − . The monetization could happen only at the maturity of the debt and 
increases the assets so that the nominal losses on the domestic debt would be fully covered5. 
This gives the following dynamics: 
  
 
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
{ } { ( ) }
, ,
, , ,
{ } { ( ) ( ) }
,
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
d EUR f EUR
f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN
d EUR d LC
t T A T B
d EUR d EUR
f EUR d LC d EUR
t T B A T B X T B
d EUR
dMM t X t B
dt
MM t MM t
B X t B A t
dt
MM t
δ
δ
= ∧ − <
= ∧ ≤ − < + −
−
=
− −
+ − − −
+
−
 (20) 
     
The exchange rate is fixed. However, it is assumed that the macroeconomic 
equilibrium is of neoclassical type. Thus, any monetization leads instantly to exchange rate 
devaluation with its equilibrium amount to be determined in short. This leads to the following 
dynamics under fQ : 
  
, , , , , ,
1 2
{ } { ( ) ( ) } { } { ( ) }
( ) ( ) ( ),
( ) f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN d EUR f EURt T B A T B X T B t T A T B
dX t dt dt
X t
ρ δ ρ δ= ∧ ≤ − < + − = ∧ − <= − −−
(21) 
 
where we have a devaluation by 1ρ , when the default is only on the domestic debt, and by 2ρ  
when it is also on the foreign one with 2 1ρ ρ> . Considering the diffusion pattern of the 
exchange rate we can assume the following dynamics for the assets themselves:  
4 This does not pose a significant restriction for the purposes of the current analysis. Namely, to have an 
indication for the fundamental values of the domestic and foreign debt from a structural financial point of view 
and to derive indicators with a good explanatory power for the spread. Considering default before the debt 
maturity is possible, but unlike any dynamic capital structure theory for the firm, where it is needed (e.g. see 
Black and Cox (1976), Saa-Requejo and Santa Clara (1997), Leland and Toft (1996) among the others), here it 
will only burden the exposition.    
5 The losses on the foreign debt are impossible to be covered, because of the limited foreign reserves. 
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 , ,
, , , , , ,
,
,
1 { } { ( ) ( ) } 2 { } { ( ) }
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
f
d EUR d EUR
f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN d EUR f EUR
d EUR Q
A A
d EUR
t T B A T B X T B t T A T B
dA t
dt dW t
A t
dt dt
µ σ
ρ δ ρ δ= ∧ ≤ − < + − = ∧ − <
= +
−
− −
 (22) 
 
The drift contains already the monetization effects. The latter two terms can be 
incorporated into it too. So assuming that , ( )d EURA t  is traded, we can get: 
 
 
,
,
,
( )
( )
( )
f
d EUR
d EUR Q
EUR A
d EUR
dA t
r dt dW t
A t
σ= +  (23) 
 
As implied above, the values of the coefficients 1ρ  and 2ρ  are chosen such that the 
money emission offsetting the losses on the domestic debt lead to an exchange rate 
depreciation exactly in an amount to have no jumps6 in , ( )d EURA t . So we have: 
 
 
( )
, , , ,
, , , ,
, , , { } { ( ) ( ) }
1 , { } { ( ) ( ) }
( ) ( ) 1
( )1
f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN
f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN
f EUR d BGN d EUR t T B A T B X T B
d EUR t T B A T B X T B
B X t B A t
A tρ
= ∧ ≤ − < + −
= ∧ ≤ − < + −
+ − − − =
= −
 (24) 
 
, , , ,, { } { ( ) } 2 , { } { ( ) }
( ) 1 ( )1
d EUR f EUR d EUR f EURd BGN t T A T B d EUR t T A T B
X t B A tρ= ∧ − < = ∧ − <− = −  (25) 
 
Note that default is defined before any monetizations and jumps realizations, so we 
take where necessary the assets and the exchange rate at T − .  
Let's turn attention now to the payoffs of the three balance sheet items as derivatives 
on the country assets , ( )d EURA t . Keeping to the notation from the reduced form model we 
have: 
 
• Foreign debt *, ( , )f EURP t T :  
, , ,max( ( ))f EUR f EUR d EURB B A T− −  
• Domestic debt *, ( , )d BGNP t T :  
, , , , ,max( ( ) ,0) max( ( ) ( ),0)d EUR f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGNA T B A T B B X T− − − − −  
• Monetary base , ( )d BGNM t : 
, , ,max( ( ) ( ),0)d EUR f EUR d BGNA T B B X T− − −  
 
The foreign bond represents a long position in a risk free bond and a short position in a 
put option with strike ,f EURB . For its price we get: 
 
* ( , )( )*
, ,
( )
, , ,
( , )
( ( max( ( ),0) | )
EUR
f
EUR
c t T T t
f EUR f EUR
r T tQ
f EUR f EUR d EUR t
P t T B e
E e B B A T G
− −
− −
=
= − −
 
 
, ,
( )
, , ,
( )
, 1 , 2
( , , , ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )
EUR
f EUR f EUREUR
r T t
f EUR f EUR d EUR
B Br T t
d EUR f EUR
B e P t T B A t
A t N d B e N d
− −
− −
= −
= − +
 (26) 
 
6 Note that by default we have no such in , ( )d BGNA t  too. 
 25 
                                                 
The foreign yield to maturity is: 
 
*
,*
,
( , )1( , ) log f EUREUR
f EUR
P t T
c t T
T t B
 
= −   −  
 
 
and the credit spread is: 
 
( )
, ,* *
2 1
,
,
,
,
1 1( , ) ( , ) log ( ) ( )
( , )
( ( , ))1 1log log ( ( , )) ,
( , )
f EUR f EURB B
EUR EUR EUR
f EUR
f EUR
f EUR
f EUR
s t T c t T r N d N d
T t t T
f t T
h t T
T t t T T t
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
 
= − = − + −  −  
 
= − = −  − − 
 (27) 
 
Where 
,
,
,
2
,
1,2
1 1log ( )
( , ) 2 d EUR
f EUR
d EUR
A
f EURB
A
T t
t T
d
T t
σ
ρ
σ
 
± −  
 =
−
, 
( )
,
,
,
( , )
( )
EURr T t
f EUR
f EUR
d EUR
e B
t T
A t
ρ
− −
=  is the 
foreign quasi-leverage ratio, and the functions (.)f  and (.)g  will be defined in the next 
section. 
The domestic debt represents a long position in a call option with stochastic strike 
, , ( )f EUR d BGNB B X T+ − . For its price we get: 
 
 
* ( , )( )*
, ,
, , , , ,
( , )
( , , , ( )) ( , , ( ) , ( ))
BGNc t T T t
d BGN d BGN
BGN f EUR d EUR BGN f EUR d BGN d EUR
P t T B e
C t T B A t C t T B X T B A t
− −=
= − + −  (28) 
, , , , , ,, ,,, ( )
1 1 2 2
( )
,
( )
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
f EUR f EUR d BGN f EUR f EUR d BGNEUR
EUR
B B B B B Bf EURd EUR r T t
r T t
d BGN
BA t
N d N d e N d N d
X t X t
B e
− −
− −
= − − −
−
 
 
where 
,
, ,
,
2
, ,,
1,2
1 1log ( )
( , ) ( , ) 2 d EUR
f EUR f BGN
d EUR
A
f EUR d EURB B
A
T t
t T t T
d
T t
σ
ρ ρ
σ
 
± −  + =
−
 and 
( )
,
,
,
( )
( , )
( )
EURr T t
d BGN
d EUR
d EUR
e X t B
t T
A t
ρ
− −
=  is the domestic quasi-leverage ratio.  
The domestic yield to maturity is: 
 
*
,*
,
( , )1( , ) log d BGNBGN
d BGN
P t T
c t T
T t B
 
= −   −  
 
 
and the currency spread could be written as: 
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 * * * * *
,
currency spread general currency spread credit spread
* *
term general currency spread
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) ) ( ( , ) )
( ( , ) )
BGN EUR BGN EUR BGN EUR EUR EUR
BGN BGN
s t T c t T c t T c t T r c t T r
c t T r
= − = − − −
= −
  
 
* * * *
term credit sprerad=credit spread short rates currency spread
( ( , ) )EUR EUR BGN EURc t T r r r− − + −  
 (29) 
 
The first representation is standard. The second representation gives the currency 
spread as a difference between the general currency spread and the credit spread. Note that the 
latter two spreads have as a base the riskless EUR curve which is flat in the standard structural 
models. So we have an equality of the riskless EUR yield to maturity to the short EUR 
riskless rate for any maturity. The third representation adds as an additional element the term 
structure of the general currency spread and the credit spread.  
Everywhere the short rates are defined in a standard way: 
 
 
* * *
* * *
( , ) ( , ) ,  ( , ) ( , ) ,  
( , ) ( , )
T t T t
EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
T t
BGN BGN BGN
c t T c t t r c t T c t t r
c t T c t t r
↓ ↓
↓
→ = → =
→ =
 (30) 
 
Since in structural models as the current one the default time is defined as a 
predictable stopping time, we have the standard result that there is no infinitesimal credit 
spread. So *EUR EURr r=  is valid. Analogously, there should be no infinitesimal currency spread. 
So *BGN BGNr r=  is valid. However, we haven’t defined BGNr  yet, and exactly the latter could be 
considered as a definition. It represents the riskless rate in BGN. Both EURr  and BGNr  are 
exogenous parameters to the model. We will come back to that analysis in the next section 
and conceptually close it there.    
Further, from (30) and the definition of (.)f  that will follow, we have: 
 
 , , , ,* ,
, ,
( ) ( )1( , ) log
( )
f EUR f EUR d EUR f EUR
BGN EUR
d EUR f EUR
f f
s t T
T t f
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 + −
= −   −  
 (31) 
 
 The payoffs, the balance sheet positions, and scenarios for their evolution are 
represented in Figure 11. The country could choose two possibilities at default – to incur the 
loss given default (LGD) or to monetize. The assets in EUR before any exchange rate 
devaluation are represented on the x -axis. We denote them by , ( )d EURA T− . Then we 
distinguish between three cases for the fair values of the instruments: 1) no monetization and 
a full incur of the LGD (in black), 2) full monetization to avoid default and no exchange rate 
devaluation (in red), 3) no monetization with a full exchange rate devaluation (in blue). The 
first scenario is the realistic benchmark one and it stays in between the next too which could 
be considered as the border cases. We illustrate them just for completeness. 
 The figure represents what happens when there is a full monetization and what the 
equilibrium values of the devaluation are so that effectively scenario 1) is in effect. So for any 
asset value ,
i
d EURA , i =1,2, there are equilibrium values of the devaluations iρ , i =1,2, such 
that at that asset values the gains and losses under scenarios 2) and 3) are equalized.      
  
 
 
 27 
Figure 10. Balance sheet positions7 under different scenarios 
 
 
 
7 Note that * *, , , , ,( ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )d EUR d EUR f EUR d EUR d EURMM t M t P t T P t T A t+ + + =  must hold at every t  incl. t T= . The 
discontinuity in the blue line for the two types of debt has mainly a technical character. 
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3.2. Technical notes 
 
In this subsection, we will present several technical results which will provide a better 
understanding of the model setting.  
First, as already seen, an important role in our analysis would have the function 
2 1( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))f x N d x x N d x= + − , where x  denotes the leverage, so 
,
,
2
1,2
1 1log ( )
2( )
d EUR
d EUR
A
A
T t
xd x
T t
σ
σ
  + − 
 =
−
. It is straightforward to prove that ( )f x  is increasing and 
concave for 0x > . We have also 
0
lim ( ) 0
x
f x
→
=  and lim ( ) 1
x
f x
→∞
= . The concavity of ( )f x  gives 
'
0
lim ( ) 1
x
f x
→
=  and 'lim ( ) 0
x
f x
→∞
= . Further, if we consider ( )( ) f xh x
x
= , the concavity of ( )f x  
gives that ( )h x  is decreasing for 0x > . We have also 
0
lim ( ) 1
x
h x
→
=  and lim ( ) 0
x
h x
→∞
= . As far as 
the concavity of ( )h x  is concerned, the situation is more delicate. Despite conceptually 
straightforward, it is technically demanding to prove by direct differentiation that ( )h x  is 
concave for (0, ]x ζ∈  and convex for ( , )x ζ∈ +∞  for some point ζ . Analogously, we have 
that log( ( ))h x  is concave for (0, ]x λ∈  and convex for ( , )x λ∈ +∞  for some point λ . A 
further result, technically involved but conceptually straightforward, is that 
' ( )
( )
xf x
f x
 is 
decreasing for 0x > . 
Second, we can get also easily that the following equations are valid: 
 
 ,
, ,
( )
1 , , { ( ) }( ) ( ) ( ( )1 | )
f
f EUR EUR
d EUR f EUR
B r T tQ
d EUR d EUR A T B tN d A t E e A T G
− −
≥=  (32) 
 ,2 , ,( ) ( ( ) | )f EUR
B f
d EUR f EUR tN d Q A T B G= ≥  (33) 
  
Let’s turn back now to equations (24) and (25). Since 1ρ  and 2ρ   are assumed to be 
fixed and determined at the initial time t , we can take expectations in these equations and 
together with (32) and (33) we obtain: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
, , , , , ,
, , ,
, ,
1 1 , 2 2 ,
,
1 , 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( )
f EUR f EUR d BGN f EUR f EUR d BGN
f EUR f EUR d BGN
B B B B B B
f EUR d BGN
B B B
d EUR
N d N d B N d N d X t B
A t N d N dρ
− + −
= + −
 (34) 
 , ,, 2 2 , 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))f EUR f EUR
B B
d BGN d EURX t B N d A t N dρ− = −  (35) 
 
 Solving the latter we get the equilibrium values for the exchange rate devaluations 1
eρ   
and 2
eρ . 
 Third, it is interesting to take a deeper look at the dynamics of the instruments in the 
reduced form model. Exactly the same no-arbitrage conditions as the one from the reduced 
form model hold and we write them again for completeness. The processes: 
 
                  
* * * *
, , , ,( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )( , ) , , , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
f EUR f EUR d BGN d BGNEUR
EUR EUR EUR EUR EUR
B t P t T B t T X t P t T X tP t T
B t B t B t B t B t
        (NoArb) 
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must be local martingales under fQ . For the first two the condition is trivially met because 
we have *EUR EURr r= . The third and the fourth processes determine the drift of the bonds 
dynamics. Their volatility follows directly from the Ito’s lemma as shown in Appendix 2. For 
the foreign bond we have:    
 
 ,
,
,
*
,
*
, 2
,
1
( , )
( )
( , ) ( )1 ( , )
( )
fd EUR
f EUR
f EUR
Af EUR Q
EUR B
f EUR
f EUR B
dP t T
r dt dW t
P t T N dt T
N d
σ
ρ
= +
+
−
 (36) 
 
and for the domestic one: 
 
 
*
,
*
,
( , )
( , )
d EUR
EUR
d EUR
dP t T
r dt
P t T
=  (37) 
, , ,
,
, , , , , , , ,
,
1 1
, , ,
1 1 , 2 2 , 2
( ( ) ( ))
( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
f EUR f EUR d BGN
fd EUR
f EUR f EUR d BGN f EUR f EUR d BGN f EUR d BGN
B B B
A Q
B B B B B B B B
f EUR d EUR
N d N d
dW t
N d N d N d N d N d
σ
ρ ρ
−
+
− − − +
 
The fifth process gives the drift of the risk neutral dynamics of the exchange rate. We have 
that in case of no default BGN EURr r=  is valid. In case of default, the BGN rate jumps: 
 
 
, , , , , ,1 { } { ( ) ( ) } 2 { } { ( ) }f EUR d EUR f EUR d BGN d EUR f EURBGN EUR t T B A T B X T B t T A T B
r r ρ δ ρ δ= ∧ ≤ < + − = ∧ <= + +  (38) 
 
3.3. Spreads diagnostics 
 
In this subsection, we go deeper into the analysis of the origin of the two spreads and 
what factors drive them.  
The Merton model in its classical form is enough to characterize the credit spread. As 
discussed in Cossin and Pirotte (2000), the latter appears because the holders of foreign debt 
have in effect a short position in a put option which reflects in general the expected 
probability of default and recovery. The credit spread can be explained concisely by three 
indicators - 1) the foreign debt quasi-leverage ratio ,f EURρ , 2) the assets' volatility ,d EURAσ , and 
3) the debt maturity. It is increasing in the former two and this is straightforward to be proved 
from the formulas above. Further, since they increase the risk, the economic intuition is in 
accordance. As far as the maturity T t−  is concerned, the situation is a little bit more 
complicated. This is due to the fact that the default is very probable in the short run with the 
assets close to the default boundary. We could only expect with the increase in maturity to 
postpone the payment of the face value and this to have a positive impact on the spread. If 
, ( , ) 1f EUR t Tρ < , then the spread is initially increasing with respect to T t−  and after a certain 
point starts to be decreasing. This is expression of the fact that higher maturity leads to higher 
local volatility of the bond and this causes the spread rise. However, postponing the payment 
of the face value starts to dominate the first effect after a threshold. In essence, the bond 
becomes close to perpetuity, and the spread drops.  
The situation with the currency spread is more complicated. In general, from a 
structural point of view, it arises due to three effects that add up to each other: 1) probability 
of default on the domestic debt, 2) subordination of the domestic debt to the foreign one, 3) 
likely monetization in case of pending default on domestic debt and exchange rate 
devaluation. A technical analysis of the sensitivities similar to the one from the previous 
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paragraph is possible but not needed for the current setting and will go beyond the scope of 
the paper. What is important is to see from (31) that the currency spread is always positive. 
Further, straightforward differentiation and using the properties of the functions (.)f  and (.)h  
gives that it is increasing in the total leverage , ,EUR f EUR d EURρ ρ ρ= +  and the domestic 
leverage ,d EURρ . For low starting values of the foreign leverage ,f EURρ  it is increasing in it 
and then starts to decrease. This is due to the fact that the credit spreads starts bearing most of 
the burden of the increased leverage. 
 
3.4. Empirical analysis 
 
3.4.1. General notes 
 
In this subsection, we first estimate the structural model and evaluate its performance. 
The logic behind the procedure, as discussed in Gray and Malone (2008), is from market 
values for the domestic debt and the monetary base, which form the local currency liabilities 
,d EURLCL , to derive the implied values of the country assets and their volatility. It is good 
these most junior claims to be considered together, because they behave like an equity tranche 
with a fixed detachment point in foreign currency in the face of the default barrier of foreign 
debt. Thus, for ,d EURLCL  both the intuition and machinery of the classical Merton model can 
be used. So their value is equal to that of a call option with strike the default boundary of the 
foreign debt ,f EURB . We get: 
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where  * ( , )BGNc t T  is the risky yield to maturity in local currency, 
*
, ( )d BGND t  is the market value 
of domestic debt denominated in BGN, *, ( )d EURD t   is the market value of domestic debt 
denominated in EUR. Since that value is the one of a traded instrument, namely, the local 
currency bond, we can also denote it by * *, ,( ) ( , )d EUR d EURD t P t T= . Note that we make explicit 
the dependence on the face value. This is because in the structural setting the price of the 
bond is not only homogenous of degree one solely in ,d BGNB , but also simultaneously in 
,d BGNB  and , ( )d BGNA t . This is a deviation from the usual model free pricing and the one of the 
reduced form models as well. So writing this dependence is important. However, for 
notational convenience, we will always use *, ( , )d EURP t T  keeping in mind what the actual 
dependence is.   
 The purpose of the model is from market values for the domestic debt, and thus 
,d EURLCL , to infer the value of the assets , ( )d EURA t  and their volatility ,d EURAσ . This can be 
done using the system: 
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where the second equation comes from comparing the dynamics of , ( )d EURLCL t  to what the 
Ito's lemma implies for it. The system can be solved iteratively to infer , ( )d EURA t  and ,d EURAσ . 
The input for the variables participating in the processes are represented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Key model variables 
Variable Legend 
,d BGNM  Monetary base BGN 
EURr  Riskless short rate in EUR ( EURr= ) 
*
EURr  Risky short rate in EUR 
* ( , )EURc t T  Risky yield to maturity in EUR 
*
BGNr  Risky short rate in BGN 
* ( , )BGNc t T  Risky yield to maturity in BGN 
,f EURB  Default boundary of the foreign debt 
,d BGNB  Default boundary of the domestic debt 
X  Spot exchange rate 
*
,d EURP
σ / *
,d EURP
σ  Volatility of domestic/foreign debt in EUR 
*
,,EUR d EURM P
ρ  Correlation between the monetary base and the 
domestic debt 
,d EURM
σ  Volatility of the monetary base denominated in EUR 
 
Further, we have the identities: 
 
1. , ,short term debt + long term debt + 1 year interest ratesd BGN d BGNB α=   
2. , ,short term debt + long term debt + 1 year interest ratesd EUR f EURB α=  
3. , ,d EUR d BGNM M X=  
4. *, , ,d EUR d EUR d EURLCL M P= +  
5. *, , ,
*
, ,2 2 2
* *
, , , ,
d EUR d EUR d EUR
d EUR d EUR
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d EUR d EUR d EUR d EUR
M P
M P M P
σ σ σ
   
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It must be noted that we have changed the notation. Now ,d BGNB  and ,f EURB  represent 
the default boundaries of the two types of debt instead of their face values. The difference 
comes because it is realistic to assume that the short term debt and only a fraction of the long 
term one participate in forming the boundary. The parameter α is to be determined but an 
empirically motivated value is 0.5 .  
 
3.4.2. Model estimation 
 
We use monthly data for the face value of domestic debt, face value of foreign debt, 
and the monetary base. The monetary base is taken to be seasonally adjusted so that additional 
noise is avoided. Further, we treat the fiscal reserve as a part of it which is plausible 
assumption from a structural point of view. We estimate the market value of the domestic 
debt by taking data for all bonds outstanding at the corresponding point in time and price 
them to the zero yield curve already constructed. Our data sources are statistical departments 
of the Bulgarian National Bank and the Ministry of Finance.     
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In Figure 11, we present the estimated risk neutral probabilities of default of the 
foreign debt and, for comparison reasons, in Figure 12, we show also those implied by the 
market values of the credit spread. 
 
Figure 11. Default probabilities by maturity sector (implied by the market)  
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Figure 12. Default probabilities by maturity sector (structural model)  
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The figures present and evaluate in the best possible way how and to what extent the 
structural model works. It should be emphasized that to estimate the default probabilities of 
foreign debt, the Merton model relies only on information about the domestic bonds and the 
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monetary base8. Then the implied assets of the country and their volatilities are estimated. 
Finally, we find the probability of default of the foreign debt together with the implied market 
leverage and other risky indicators of interest. 
     As expected, we see that the probabilities of default the structural model gives are 
much smoother than the ones implied by the market which reflects the gradual evolution of 
the risk fundamentals based on the macro-financial balance sheet information about the 
sovereign. Further, they are always a little bit lower in crisis periods producing a stable 
evolution where market sentiment playing a minor roles. Hardly can we expect sudden shifts 
in the view about the country's fundamentals. However, this is possible for the market quotes 
because additional factors like contagion, market sentiment, and global risk aversion play a 
significant role. Anyway, we see visually that the fundamentals are quite an important driver 
for the default probabilities showing consistency in pricing of the two types of debt. They 
capture to a satisfactory degree also the crisis periods indicated by the vertical lines. 
     After this preliminary analysis, we move to more formal one linking together macro, 
financial, and no-arbitrage information. 
 
4. Integrated factor analysis 
 
In this section, we focus on giving economic interpretation of the priced factors for the 
credit and currency risks that we got from the reduced form model. We use three types of 
variables having different informational content.  
First, from market sentiment point of view, proxies for the global risk aversion are 
considered. Since the latter is a very broad concept, to capture its heterogeneity, we refer to 
several indices that got popularity. We take the VIX and the ITRAXX Europe IG to proxy the 
overall global uncertainty and the one of the corporate segment respectively. To proxy the risk 
of the banking system, we take the Euribor OIS spread9. Lastly, we refer to the JP Morgan’s 
EMBI+ Europe and EMBI Global indices to capture the risk of the emerging markets 
segment.    
Second, from structural financial point of view, we take advantage of the risky 
indicators from the previous section: the domestic and foreign leverage as well as the asset 
volatility.  
Third, we resort to macro variables like the GDP growth, the balance of payments 
position, and the budget deficit of Bulgaria. They complete the picture and give an overall 
macro characterization of the sovereign risk of the country. As additional macro variables, we 
take also the short end of the BGN and EUR curves. They are proxied by the BGN overnight 
rate (Leonia), EUR overnight rate (Eonia), and the interbank deposit rates from one week to 
three weeks. 
 For all the series that have a term structure we work with their shift and slope factors 
which could be viewed as a dimensionality reduction. We show regression results in daily and 
monthly frequencies with only the latter allowing taking advantage of the full set of variables 
from above. There we use monthly data for all the series so that there is a frequency 
consistency between the different sorts of data. We convert the quarterly data of the three 
main macro variables from above to monthly by linear interpolation. Further, for the daily 
series we take end of the month values. 
We do not include further macroeconomic variables due to two main reasons. First, 
their frequency is usually on quarterly basis, so this would be in a dissonance with the 
majority of our main series that are given on daily basis. Thus the focus would be shifted to 
quarterly data which is not enough for robust statistical analysis with series available over 
several years only. Second, and more important, the macroeconomic information usually is 
8 Under a CBA the lack of volatility in the exchange rate is compensated by volatility in the monetary base. 
9 Computed for the short maturity segment as a difference between the Euribor and the OIS rate.   
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priced much in advance by the financial markets. So we would need to use an appropriate lag 
structure which is not clear what to be a priori. Technically, this would require resorting to a 
full fledged Var-Vec model which is possible to be employed as a toolkit but it would 
complicate too much the analysis and would enter into conceptual contradiction to the tools of 
the arbitrage analysis. Namely, the latter is based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
usually does not consider lag and autocorrelation structures. We would leave such an 
extension together with further diagnostics of the informational content of the factors and 
their interactions with the macro variables for future research. 
 We regress the factors by the variables proposed. There is a clear indication of non-
stationarity of the levels of the series especially during the crisis period. So we use first 
differences to avoid any spurious regression problem. Robust regression and control for any 
kinds of heteroscedasticity are employed. 
We start with a daily frequency regression and use only the financial variables. The 
results for the credit and currency spreads’ factors are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 
respectively:  
 
Table 6. Credit spread factors10 (daily data) 
explanatory/dependent shift_credit_spread∆  
c  0.0001* (0.0000) 
shift_BGN_rate∆  0.0332 * (0.0058) 
shift_ITRAXX∆  0.0050 * (0.0013) 
shift_Euribor_OIS_spread∆  0.0006* (0.0001) 
shift_EMBI_Global∆  -0.2196* (0.0450) 
VIX∆  0.0001* (0.0000) 
EMBI+_Europe∆  0.0014* (0.0005) 
slope_ITRAXX∆  -0.0008* (0.0003) 
slope_Euribor_OIS_spread∆  -0.0038* (0.0012) 
slope_EMBI_Global∆  0.0021** (0.0001) 
2R  0.14 
* signific. at 1% , * *signific. at 5%, * **signific. at 10% 
  
Table 7. Currency spread factors (daily data) 
explanatory/dependent shift_currency_spread∆  
c  -0.0001* (0.0000) 
shift_BGN_rate∆  -0.0001 *** (0.0062) 
shift_Euribor_OIS_spread∆  -0.0024** (0.0012) 
shift_EMBI_Global∆  0.2910* (0.04778) 
EMBI+_Europe∆  -0.0014*** (0.0005) 
slope_Euribor_OIS_spread∆  0.0021*** (0.0013) 
slope_EMBI_Global∆  -0.0053* (0.0010) 
2R  0.13 
* signific. at 1% , * *signific. at 5%, * **signific. at 10% 
 
For both spreads we see high significance of large amount of the risk factors with 
relatively high 2R  for such type of regressions. All the coefficients have the right sign in the 
credit spread factor regression. Namely, the shifts of the risky factors push upwards the 
Bulgarian credit spread one so their coefficients are positive. Further, a higher slope of them 
is characterized by a boom and smooth functioning of the global economy which leads to a 
10 The standard errors are shown in the brackets 
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lower credit spread in Bulgaria. This explains the negative sign of the slopes’ coefficients. 
The EMBI+ Europe is the only exception where the coefficients have opposite signs to what 
is expected. Most probably this is due to the fact that this index captures in a more focused 
way the forces that play at the emerging markets segment. So the flight to quality effect in the 
turbulent times is reflected. It outweighs any increase of the global riskiness.  
Interestingly, in the currency spread regression, despite less, we have also a good 
amount of significant explanatory factors. At first glance, this seems paradoxical to the 
previous analysis that this spread is mainly driven by liquidity factors and more or less should 
have a random evolution. So the relatively high explanatory power seems to be strange. 
However, if we look at the signs of the coefficients, they have opposite signs to the ones of 
the previous regression. This gives an explanation what is going on. We have a purely 
technical phenomenon. Namely, the risky factors explain quite well both the EUR and BGN 
risky curves of Bulgaria but are only subject to different weights. Due to the already discussed 
higher relative elasticity of the EUR curve to shocks than the BGN one, the credit and 
currency spreads have in turbulent times opposite movement. So it is natural to expect 
different signs of the coefficients. Yet, if we add them, we still get correct signs for the 
general currency spread.      
We continue now with the monthly data regression adding macrofinancial and macro 
variables in the analysis. The results are shown in Table 8 for the credit spread and in Table 9 
for the currency one. 
 
Table 8. Credit spread factors (monthly data) 
explanatory/dependent shift_credit_spread∆  
c  0.0057 (0.0057) 
shift_ITRAXX∆  0.1156* (0.0167) 
shift_Euribor_OIS_spread∆  0.0272* (0.0010) 
slope_ITRAXX∆  -0.0174* (0.0042) 
slope_foreign_leverage∆  -0.0619* (0.0284) 
2R  0.64 
* signific. at 1% , * *signific. at 5%, * **signific. at 10% 
  
Table 9. Currency spread factors (monthly data) 
explanatory/dependent shift_currency_spread∆  
c  -0.0197 (0.0068) 
shift_EMBI_Global∆  1.0550* (0.0120) 
GDP_rate∆  2.43** (1.1091) 
2R  0.51 
* signific. at 1% , * *signific. at 5%, * **signific. at 10% 
 
We see a picture helping us to better understand the origin of the two spreads, but 
interestingly, a bit differently from its daily data counterpart above. In both cases, the 
explanatory power of the regression is quite high and the reason for this is that we are closer 
to the fundamentals and the noise from daily observations is eliminated.  
For the credit spread we see significance of the global risk aversion factors similar to 
the daily data case. So both the risk of the corporate sector and the one of the banking system 
are transferred to the CDS premiums of the emerging markets countries segment with 
Bulgaria being part of the latter. Surprisingly, the structural indicators do not play a role. 
Neither the leverage ratios shifts, nor the asset volatility shift is significant. Actually, as we 
have seen above, the images of the default probabilities from structural and reduced form 
point of view are very similar. So, despite not shown, in a regression in levels, the leverage 
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matters, but as already mentioned, there are econometric problems with a good identification. 
The same is valid for the macro variables too. As already mentioned, an analysis in levels 
would require Var-Vec methods and would go beyond the scope of the current paper and 
could be postponed for future research where a cross country comparison would be necessary 
too11. The significance of the slope of the foreign leverage ratio has a technical character. 
Since the structural model is estimated by the term structure of the BGN curve and the 
monetary base, it is natural to expect the term structure to be reflected in the output for the 
credit spread.  
For the currency spread we see a striking result. The global risk aversion coming from 
the corporate and banking sectors is not significant. Only the one coming from the emerging 
markets plays a role. This is consistent with the daily data regression where we have similar 
picture. So all these shows that the currency spread is not only due to liquidity and does not 
only have a technical character. Namely, the EUR curve dynamics12 is predominantly subject 
to risk factors coming from the corporate and banking sectors especially considering data on 
monthly basis which captures better the fundamentals picture. On the opposite, the BGN 
curve dynamics is driven by factors coming from the other emerging markets and especially 
common factors driving the bonds as an asset class. Idiosyncratic macro and macrofinancial 
variables seem to be more related to the levels than to the dynamics of the curves and the 
spreads. The significance of the GDP growth rate and its positive weight are reflecting the just 
hinted difference between the CDS and the bonds as asset classes. During the boom period 
both the credit and the currency spreads were falling. However, at the same time, the GDP 
growth was making the BGN treasuries lose attractiveness because equities and credit were 
giving a much higher return. When the crisis hit the Bulgarian economy the treasuries were 
the safe heaven and there was a flight to quality effect. The Bulgarian CDS and the EUR 
curve did not have such a status.        
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
The paper studied in a comprehensive way the local currency and hard currency yield 
curves of Bulgaria. This was done from a no-arbitrage, structural financial and 
macroeconomic points of view. The formal no-arbitrage conditions that need to hold are the 
main result of the paper. They give a natural basis for analysis of the factors that drive the 
credit and currency risks of the country. We provided a set of indicators that should play a 
central role. The theoretical analysis has a leading role. Our empirical considerations have a 
complementary one and provide scope for further discussions and research. However, we 
found that in the Bulgarian case the specially build theoretical setting works quite well and the 
factors derived could explain to a large extent the regularities the country is subject to in a 
time period characterized by financial innovation, economic growth, market turmoil, financial 
crisis, and recession. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 For grasping to a large extent the economic forces behind the curves our setting is pretty enough.  
12 So the CDS too. 
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Appendix 1 
 
We prove here the formulas about the bonds’ prices dynamics of the reduced form 
model. Applying the Ito’s lemma and the Girsanov’s theorem to the definition of the bonds’ 
prices we can get: 
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Further, we have the dynamics of the exchange rate: 
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So using the no-arbitrage conditions and equating the expected local drifts to the risk 
free rate, we get the results shown in the main text. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
We prove here the formulas about the bonds’ prices dynamics of the structural form 
model. For the foreign debt we have that the price is a function of the assets, i.e. it holds that 
*
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But for the price itself we could also assume the dynamics: 
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Making the corresponding volatility terms equal we get: 
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For the domestic debt we have that the price is a function of the stochastic processes of 
the assets, exchange rate, and monetization. It holds that 
*
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dynamics: 
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and for the exchange rate: 
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By the Ito’s lemma we get: 
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For the price of the domestic bond we could also assume the dynamics: 
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Making the respective terms equal, gives us: 
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In general, the jump effects { }( )t TF dtδ =∆  are incorporated into the drift, but since we assumed 
that the exchange rate depreciation offsets the monetization, actually, we do not have jumps. 
Further, we can see that AF  is the Black-Scholes delta of the portfolio of the two options: 
, , , , ,( , , , ( )) ( , , ( ) , ( ))BGN f EUR d EUR BGN f EUR d BGN d EURC t T B A t C t T B X T B A t− + −  which in fact gives 
the price of the bond. We found that it is: 
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The homogeneity of degree one of *, ( , )d EURP t T  in respect to , ( )d EURA t , ,f EURB , and 
( )X t , together with the Euler’s theorem gives directly the delta: 
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  So we get: 
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